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INTRODUCTION
To complain of the age we live  In , to  murmur a t 
the present possessors of power, to  lament the 
pas t ,  to conceive extravagant hopes of the 
fu tu re ,  are  the common d ispositions of the g rea tes t  
pa rt  of mankind . . . .  Such complaints and 
humors have existed  in a l l  times; ye t as a l l  
times have not been a l ik e ,  true  p o l i t ic a l  sagacity 
manifests i t s e l f  in d istinguishing  th a t  complaint 
which only characterizes the general infirm ity  of 
human nature, from those which are symptoms of the 
p a r t icu la r  distemperature of our own a i r  and 
season.
Edmund Burke, "Thoughts on the 
Cause of the Present Discontents" 
in The Writings and Speeches of 
Edmund Burke (London: Bickers and 
Sons, L td .,  1901), p. 437
Foreign success with a grievance-handling mechanism known as the 
ombudsman has prompted e f fo r ts  to t ra n s fe r  i t  to  the federa l,  s ta te  
and local governments in the United S ta tes . Proponents of the in ­
s t i tu t io n  have argued th a t  since the Scandinavian model of the 
ombudsman concept has been the most e ffec t iv e  complaint mechanism 
elsewhere, i t  would be only a matter of time before i t  would be 
widely adopted in th is  country. However, the operation and success 
of the c la ss ica l  ombudsman in s t i tu t io n  requires the ex is­
tence of a p a r t icu la r  p o l i t ic a l  and adm inistrative environment.
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Because of th is ,  many ombudsman scholars have questioned whether 
the p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re  and adm inistrative in s t i tu t io n s  in the 
United States are compatible with the overall goals and objectives 
of an ombudsman o ff ice  patterned a f te r  the Scandinavian model.
This paper focuses on the ch a rac te r is t ic s  associated with the 
c la ss ica l  ombudsman in s t i tu t io n  and discusses th e i r  general app li-  
b i l i t y  to the American p o l i t ic a l  system. Since attempts have 
been made to adopt the ombudsman in s t i tu t io n  a t  the federal level 
and actual experimentation with the o ff ice  is  taking place in some 
c i t i e s  and s ta te s ,  the paper i s  organized to  give an adequate 
descrip tion  of these a c t iv i t i e s  and th e i r  r e la t iv e  success. F ina lly , 
once an analysis of fed e ra l ,  s ta te  and local involvement with the 
ombudsman concept i s  presented, a case study of an American version 
of the c la ss ica l  ombudsman in s t i tu t io n  i s  presented .
CHAPTER I 
OMBUDSMAN AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL?
In the concluding remarks of The New Public Personnel Admin­
i s t r a t i o n , Felix and Lloyd Nigro o ffe r  the re su l ts  o f a Harris Poll 
as an indication of the magnitude of the pub lic 's  disenchantment with 
government.^ The Senate subcommittee th a t  had so l ic i ted  the Harris 
organization relayed the following message in th e i r  report:
While disenchantment among the public runs deep, i t  
is  important to point out th a t  th is  d isa ffec tio n  is  f a r  
more directed a t  the leadership of our in s t i tu t io n s  than 
a t  the in s t i tu t io n s  themselves. In other s tu d ies ,  we 
have found no more than 5 percent of the public are a t  
a l l  ready to scrap the major in s t i tu t io n s  th a t  make up 
our voluntary, e s se n t ia l ly  p rivate ly  oriented society .
In th is  study i t s e l f ,  9 in every 10 people, a high number, 
expressed the cardinal a r t i c l e  of fa i th  th a t  government 
can be made to work e f f ic ie n t ly  and e ffe c t iv e ly ,  and* with­
in the parameters of l ib e r ty  a free  people require . But 
there is  a mood of skepticism about current leadership of 
nearly a l l  in s t i tu t io n s ,  and ju s t  below the surface a 
growing willingness to throw the rasca ls  out. The people 
want change, not to overthrow the ^ s te m , but to make i t  
work the way they think i t  shou ld .^
In response to th is  (and many other sim ilar rep o r ts ) ,  the National
Academy of Public Administration established a panel to  inves tiga te
and make recommendations to help curb what appeared to be a sharp
de te rio ra tion  in the qua lity  of public personnel and the subsequent
problem of the pu b lic 's  disillusionm ent and lack of confidence in
the federal government as a whole. After months of de lib era tion ,
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the panel proposed measures th a t  would insure g rea ter  control over 
the se lec tion  of p o l i t ic a l  appointees and create  a Federal Service 
Ethics Board to se t  guidelines for federal employees and Investigate
3
e th ica l questions brought before I t .  The most controversial reform 
proposed by the panel was th a t  "an ombudsman for the en tire  govern­
ment or one In each agency be appointed to  consider complaints of
4
e th ica l v io la tions against federal o f f i c i a l s . "  The purpose of th is  
section Is to  analyze the f e a s ib i l i ty  of th is  recommendation given 
the p o l i t ic a l  and adm inistrative environment tha t  ex is ts  
a t  the federal level In the United S ta tes . However, p rio r to th i s ,  
the orig ins and nature of the ombudsman concept will be discussed.
Origins and C harac teris tics  of the Ombudsman In s t i tu t io n
The ombudsman Idea originated In Sweden when the " J ü s t l t l e -
ombudsman (JO) was f i r s t  appointed as an o f f ic e r  of the le g is la tu re
5
under the Constitution of 1809." E ssen tia lly , the JO was supposed 
to be the l e g i s la tu re 's  own "defender of the law" concerned mainly 
with supervising the courts and the poll ce ;and his a c t iv i t ie s  cen­
tered In th is  realm throughout the nineteenth century. Although the 
twentieth century saw the Idea of the ombudsman spread to Finland, 
Poland, New Zealand, Guyana, Canada, B rita in ,  A ustra lia , Denmark, 
Norway, West Germany, the Philippines, Ireland , The Netherlands, and 
several c i t i e s  and s ta te s  within the United S ta tes , and the focus of
the o ff ice  of the ombudsman expanded to  include adm inistrative as 
well as ju d ic ia l  a c t iv i t i e s ,  widespread acceptance, or "Ombudsmania" 
as one scholar called  i t ,  was the exception ra ther than the ru le .^
Of the ju r isd ic t io n s  th a t  did adopt and implement the ombudsman 
system, many agreed th a t  the o ff ice  d id , in the performance o f  i t s  
complaint-handing function, enhance the re la tionsh ip  between govern­
ment and the c it izen ry . S pec if ica l ly ,  because agents of the govern­
ment can be "incompetent instead of wise, ru th less instead of vigorous,
disloyal instead of dedicated, and corrupt instead of upright,"^
there is  a r e a l i s t i c  need for someone to safeguard c it izens  against 
governmental abuse and help leaders detect and correct subordinates ' 
shortcomings.
To ensure th a t  the individual who is  delegated to carry out the 
ombudsman function has the power to operate e ffe c t iv e ly ,  many countries , 
c i t i e s  and s ta te s  have issued them the power to:
1. prosecute bureaucrats and judges in cases of
alleged criminal v io la tions ;
2. recommend a lte rn a t iv e  le g is la t iv e  and adm inistrative 
measures;
3. investigate  the a c t iv i t i e s  of a l l  government o f f ic ia l s ;
4. c r i t i c i z e  any governmental a c t iv i ty ;
5. make public his findings;
6. take up matters on his own in i t i a t iv e ;
7. s o l i c i t  complaints;
8. r e fe r  grievances to spec if ic  agencies or o f f ic ia l s ;
9. oversee f isc a l  a c t iv i ty  and auditing procedures;
10. shield c iv i l  servants from unfounded accusations; and
11. dismiss complaints ( a f te r  f i r s t  explaining the reasons 
to the complainant).*
Again, the reader must be aware of the fac t  th a t  not a l l  of 
the ombudsman off ices  currently  in existence enjoy the wide l a t i ­
tude of delegated powers depicted above. In some cases where the 
complaint-handling o ff ice  is  located in a p a r t icu la r  department, 
branch, or bureau, the focus of the ombudsman is  extremely narrow.
In general, most governmental e n t i t i e s  which have ombudsman o ff ices  
agree th a t  the o ff ice  is  there as a "watchdog" to  ensure account­
a b i l i ty  of o f f i c i a l s ,  procedural e ff ic ien cy , f isc a l  in te g r i ty ,  
responsiveness and fa irness in adm inistration; howver, how a l l  
of these are accomplished is  not a matter o f consensus. Once the 
apparatus has been constructed and the necessary powers mandated, 
the ideal grievance-handling in s t i tu t io n  i s  supposed to  be:
1. widely availab le ;
2. highly v is ib le ;
3. c lien t-cen tered ;
4. independent;
5. expert within i t s  sphere of competence; and
6. capable of developing general recommendations for 
the improvement of complaint-producing s i tu a t io n s .9
An ombudsman o ff ice  i s ,  by v ir tue  of i t s  mission (impartial 
handling of c i t iz e n  complaints), usually located in adm inistrative 
limbo, i . e . ,  inside the p o l i t ic a l  system but outside the control of 
any parent agency or p o l i t ic a l  fac tion . Also, the o f f ic e ,  according 
to Donald C. Rowat in The Ombudsman, "should be created by the 
leg is la tu re  and afforded the s ta tu s  and req u is ite  independence needed 
for i t  to  function properly."^^ S tatutory lim its  of ju r isd ic t io n
and term of o ff ice  should also be defined in the enabling le g is ­
la t io n  which also serves to  pro tec t the o ff ice  against in ternal and 
external harassment.
Many ombudsman scholars feel th a t  the se lec tion  of a person 
to f i l l  the post of ombudsman i s  a crucial phase of the system's 
implementation and, more importantly, of the subsequent success of 
an ombudsman o ff ice . Although agreement is  evident with respect 
to the person's background (lega l)  and personal q u a lif ica tion s  (the 
individual must have proven in te g r i ty ,  good judgment, courage, 
persuasiveness, enthusiasm, and energy), i t  is  not c lea r  whether 
th is  person should be selected from the c it izen ry  or the government.
Basically , three fundamental c h a rac te r is t ic s  of the Scandinavian 
ombudsman system are  evident. These are:
1. The ombudsman is  an independent and nonpartisan o f f ic e r  
of the le g is la tu re ,  usually  provided for in the con­
s t i tu t io n ,  who supervises the adm inistration;
2. he deals with sp ec if ic  complaints from the public 
against adm inistrative  in ju s tic e  and maladministration; 
and,
3. he has the power to inv es tiga te ,  c r i t ic iz e .a n d  public ize , 
but not to reverse , adm inistrative action.
I t  is  also important to  mention th a t  the governments curren tly  
u t i l i z in g  the services of an ombudsman o ff ice  do not view i t  as a 
panacea fo r a l l  of governments i l l s .  Instead, the o ff ice  i s  created 
to complement or supplement ex is ting  complaint-handling mechanisms 
and appeal procedures. I t  i s  prec ise ly  th is  emphasis th a t  has created
much of the support for an ombudsman o ff ice  a t  the federal level in 
the U.S.; consequently, an analysis of ex is ting  federal appeal 
machinery is  necessary.
Existing Grievance-handling Mechanisms 
a t  the Federal Level in the U.S.
Channels fo r c i t iz e n s '  complaints have been part  of individual
agency operations a t  a l l  levels of government for quite  some time.
However, as government a c t iv i ty  expanded in to  the private sector
a f te r  World War I I ,  the United States did not follow the same path
with respect to c i t iz e n  protection against improper use of governmental
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power as o ther coun tr ies , because "we regulate  what they na tio na lize ."  
Instead we developed a pervasive system of procedural safeguards 
and ju d ic ia l  review th a t  appears superior to any other country in the 
world.
According to William B. Gwyn, the main avenues for c it izen s  in the 
United States to redress grievances are:
The Courts—No one would deny th a t  the courts of the 
United States are important avenues of complaint against 
administration and th a t  through th e i r  decisions they im­
prove adm inistrative  procedures. When a c iv i l  servant is  
believed to have acted without legal au tho rity , to  have 
fa i led  to  have carried  out a duty defined precisely  by 
law, or to  have needlessly harmed someone's person or 
property, Americans turn to the courts fo r  redress.
Grand Ju r ie s—The defects in the courts ' performance 
of the reform function are to  be found in th e i r  
investigatory  arm, the grand ju ry , a body of c it izens  
empaneled both to bring formal charges against suspects 
in criminal cases and to uncover criminal a c t iv i ty  within
the courts ' ju r is d ic t io n s .  Equipped with a c o u r t 's  power 
to subpoena witnesses and papers, the grand ju ry  Is sup­
posed to discover criminal a c t iv i ty  and then bring charges 
against those engaged In I t .  In the case of public o f f ic e rs ,  
even when there is  no evidence upon which to base a 
criminal charge, the grand ju ry  may nevertheless Issue r e ­
ports publicly c r i t ic iz in g  persons and In s t i tu t io n s .
Government Law O fficers—Every s ta te  has an attorney 
general and d i s t r i c t  a ttorney who, among other a c t iv i t i e s ,  
may receive complaints about alleged criminal conduct by 
public o f f i c i a l s .  When he Inquired among attorneys general 
of the various s ta te s  about where c i t iz e n s  were most l ik e ly  
to go with complaints against s ta te  administration agencies. 
Professor Richard I .  Aaron was told th a t  one frequent place 
was th e i r  own o ff ices .
Chief Executives—This category Includes the President 
of the United S ta te s ,  governors of s t a t e s ,  and local ch ief 
executives. All are  In a position to  i n i t i a t e  investigations 
of adm inistrative prac tices  and to varying extents a l l  do, 
sometimes with salutory  e f f e c t s ,  but administrative reform 
must compete with the many other problems with which ch ief 
executives are concerned. As heads of adm inistration, a l l  
ch ie f  executives receive In the mall which floods Into th e i r  
o ff ices  complaints about adm inistrative  a c t iv i ty .  Letters 
of complaint to the White House or the governor's mansion 
rou tine ly  are taken care of by adm inistrative a s s is ta n ts ,  
who simply send them on to  the agencies concerned to prepare 
answers. In e f f e c t ,  without knowing I t ,  the complainant 
usually  Is addressing his complaint to  the very people he 
believes to have Injured him. This a lso  seems true of most 
lo c a l i t ie s  although some have created specialized agencies 
fo r  dealing more expertly  with complaints.
L eg isla tu res—Taken a l l  together, the American le g is la ­
t iv e  assembly. I t s  committees, and I t s  Individual members 
a re  very Important In reforming public administration and 
handling complaints about bureaucratic a c t iv i ty .  As a law­
making body, the le g is la tu re  within l im its  s e t  by the r e l e ­
vant cons titu tion  can c reate  and elim inate administrative 
agencies and prescribe ru les  by which they should operate.
At the s ta te  and local le v e ls ,  the lim its  can be consid­
e rab le . Through the a c t iv i t i e s  of I t s  committees, the 
le g is la tu re  can oversee the actual conduct of administra­
t io n ,  and through the "case work" of I t s  mmbers, I t  can 
handle a large number of Individual complaints.
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L egisla tors—To an apparently increasing degree» the 
535 members of the Congress of the United States and the 
approximately 7700 s ta te  le g is la to rs  individually  perform 
among a number of other functions th a t  of handling c i t i ­
zens' grievances against public adm inistration. In several 
respec ts , the l e g i s l a to r 's  performance of th is  function 
resembles th a t  of the Ombudsman: both provide quick se r ­
vice for the complainant a t  no trouble or expense to him­
s e l f  and both re ly  heavily fo r information upon the admin­
i s t r a t iv e  agencies themselves.
Private  A ctiv ity—Thus fa r  we have been considering 
public in s t i tu t io n s  in America which handle individual 
complaints against public administration or take a pa rt  in 
improving bureaucracy generally . There a re ,  in addition , 
p rivate  organizations which a s s i s t  in the performance of 
these functions. Research in s t i tu te s  study possible re ­
forms. In te re s t  groups of various so r ts  w ill sometimes 
intercede for a member or c l ie n t  who believes himself 
wronged by the governmental bureaucracy. The American 
Civil L iberties Union and the National Association fo r  the 
Advancement of Colored People are well known examples.
Another kind of in s t i tu t io n  which has long played a part 
in improving governmental administration as well as voic­
ing and investigating  the complaints of Individuals has 
been the American p ress , espec ia lly  when the crusade has 
been l ik e ly  to  increase c irc u la t io n .
The l i s t  of grievance-handling in s t i tu t io n s  given above i l l u s ­
t r a te s  the formal and semi-formal appeal framework availab le  to 
the American people. Informal methods, such as telephone c a l l s  to 
friends occupying powerful p os itions , b ribes , e tc .  a re  important in 
remedying grievances, but they are not considered here because they 
would probably e x is t  under any p o l i t ic a l  au thority  or adm inistrative 
process. Although i t  is  possible  to conclude, as did the panel from 
the National Academy of Public Administration, th a t  despite  the 
existence of these in s t i tu t io n s ,p u b l ic  d i s t r u s t  and disenchantment
with the federal government and i t s  personnel has not changed and, 
in f a c t ,  has increased, i t  does not automatically follow th a t  a 
federal ombudsman is  the answer to  a l l  or any of our problems. 
Moreover, before the Scandinavian model i s  t ran s fe rred , serious 
consideration should be given to  i t s  com patibility  with the p o l i t ic a l  
and adm inistrative machinery th a t  ex is ts  a t  the federal level in 
the United S ta tes .
Can the Ombudsman be Transferred?
Advocates of the ombudsman system have attempted to adopt the
idea, or forms of i t ,  a t  the federal level since the middle of the
I960 's .  Three separate b i l l s ,  one by Congressman Henry S. Reuss
(D-Wisc.) in 1965, another by Senator V. Long (D-Missouri) in
1966, and a b i l l  introduced by Jacob Jav its  in 1971, were a l l  k il led
in th e i r  respective committees because i t  was f e l t  th a t  "casework
is  the proper function of the individual member of Congress and
14should not be delegated to  an adm inistrative body." Also, many
examples of ombudsman-type off ices  have existed or are currently
in operation; such as the now defunct Civil Rights Commission, the
Loyalty Review Board, and the P res iden t 's  Listening Post or the
ex is ting  offices of the Inspector General of the Army, Comptroller
15
General and the Court of Claims.
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Several of the most often mentioned reasons for doubting th a t  
an ombudsman system can be Implemented and successfully  operated a t  
the federal level include:
1. The tremendous s ize  and population of th is  country 
would extremely hamper the e f fo r ts  of one man or group 
of men (and th e i r  s t a f f )  to handle adequately c i t iz e n s '  
complaints. To underscore the volume of grievances 
th a t  might be expected, "the Executive Branch currently  
receives about 40,000 c a l ls  and l e t t e r s  a year tha t  
seek assis tance  in matters involving federal a c t iv i t ie s .  
Professor Gel1horn, in his book When Americans Complain, 
estimated th a t  "well over 200,000 complaints about 
administration reach congressional o ff ices  in the course 
of a year."^^ To handle such a massive caseload,
Kenneth Culp Davis predicted th a t  a s t a f f  from 2,000 to 
4,000 people would be needed, and even then f a i r  and equal
treatment in the processing of c i t iz e n s '  grievances could
18not be guaranteed.
2. In our federal system, overlapping ju r isd ic t io n s  are the 
ru le  ra the r  than the exception, not to mention the 
cooperative ventures th a t  federa l,  s t a t e ,  and local govern­
ments en te r in to  as a matter of course. Consequently, a 
federal ombudsman investigating  c i t iz e n s '  complaints
11
would be confronted on a continuing basis with grievances 
th a t  involved more than one p o l i t ic a l  or adm inistrative 
ju r is d ic t io n .  In order to remedy a complaint leveled 
against more than one level of government, an ombudsman 
would have to be endowed with considerable adm inistrative 
and legal au thority  — a phenomenon th a t  does not, a t  
le a s t  fo r the time being, appear l ik e ly ,  given the a t t i tu d e  
already expressed by Congress toward the ombudsman concept.
3. The primary roadblock th a t  stands in the way of the 
ombudsman idea a t  the federal level i s  the constitu tiona l 
p rinc ip le  of separation of powers. Particularly , the 
creation  of another iso la ted  pocket o f adm inistrative 
au thority  would "cause a serious d e b il i ta t io n  of the
Presidency and . . . would aggravate the trend toward . . .
19diffusion  of con tro l."
4. I f  the o ff ice  of an ombudsman were created by Congress, 
the natural antagonism th a t  e x is ts  between the Congress 
and the Executive would be in te n s if ied .  I t  i s  also  con­
ceivable th a t ,  as a creature  of Congress, the ombudsman 
could be used as a tool fo r partisan  ends o r ,  more 
importantly, be gradually delegated the respo nsib ili ty  
of handling many or a l l  of constituen t grievances.
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5. The re la tionsh ip  tha t  would e x is t  between the ombudsman 
o ff ice  and the courts has ye t to  be defined. Some 
ombudsman scholars argue th a t  because of the vague 
d is t in c t io n  between questions of administrative due 
process and problems of adm inistrative  policy in the 
United S ta te s ,  i t  would be easy fo r  an ombudsman to  over­
step his bounds. Although proponents of th is  system s ta te  
th a t  his au thority  would extend to  "discretionary  de­
cis ions of administrators which courts typ ica lly  are
20re luc tan t  to  touch," no pattern  has ye t been observed to 
d is tingu ish  what decisions they were refe rr ing  to .
6. Another important consideration is  the fa c t  that no matter 
what branch of government created the o ff ice  or where i t  
is  located, partisanship  would always be a fac to r . I t  
would be d i f f i c u l t  fo r  an ombudsman to transcend party 
s t r i f e  espec ia lly  when the o ff ice  would owe i t s  ex­
istence to one p o l i t ic a l  fac tion  or another.
7. In many cases "the effectiveness of the foreign ombudsman
has hinged on highly s ig n if ic an t  in tang ib les , such as
21personality , image, or s ta t io n ."  Although these 
q u a l i t ie s  would be equally as important in our p o l i t ic a l
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system, there is  absolutely  no guarantee th a t  they 
would have any e f f e c t  on the operation of an ombudsman 
o ff ice .
The preceding information has been designed to provide some in ­
d ica tion  of the ch ief de te rren ts  to the implementation of the ombuds­
man system a t  the federal level in the United S ta tes . Although in ­
s t i tu t io n a l  obstacles have prevented the adoption of reforms of 
th is  type thus f a r ,  current trends toward expanded adm inistrative 
safeguards and growing d is sa t is fa c t io n  with ex is ting  appeal 
machinery may combine to stim ulate  additional in te re s t  in le s s -  
s t ru c tu red , more informal and inexpensive grievance-handling 
mechanisms such as the ombudsman.
Conclusion
The United States does share common t ie s  with those ju r isd ic t io n s
th a t  u t i l i z e  the services of an ombudsman for the simple reason th a t
"sophisticated  organizations th a t  exercise power in industria l
22
nations may not always ac t  in the public in te r e s t ."  S p ec if ica lly ,
"both professional and lay analysts of the administrative and p o l i t ic a l
p ro cess . . .point to supposed inadequacies of our often exasperatingly
vexatious, often dup lica tive , occasionally confused and confusing,
23
and always maligned federal system of government." Whether an 
ombudsman for the en tire  government or one in each agency would, in 
concert with ex is ting  appeal and grievance handling mechanisms, be 
able to e f fe c t  positive  changes in current operations, procedures.
14
and a t t i tu d e s ,  remains to be seen. Until actual experimentation 
with the ombudsman In s t i tu t io n  occurs, there Is  no way to determine 
I t s  com patibility  with the p o l i t ic a l  and administrative environ­
ment th a t  curren tly  ex is ts  a t  the federal level In the United 
S ta te s .
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CHAPTER II 
STATE OMBUDSMANIA: A PLUS OR A MINUS ?
Since the early  1960's, p o l i t ic ia n s ,  scholars, s tudents , ad­
m in is tra to rs ,  and private  c i t iz e n s  have been ac tive ly  lobbying 
s ta te  o f f ic ia l s  in support of a grievance-handling mechanism modeled 
a f te r  the Scandinavian Ombudsman Office*. By the end of the 
1960's ,  two major conferences** had been held sp e c if ica lly  to discuss 
the p o s s ib i l i ty  of tran sfe rr ing  the ombudsman concept to the United 
States and i t  was concluded tha t:  "We recommend the e s ta b l is h ­
ment of an ombudsman a t  the s ta te  level . . . .  At th is  po in t, ex­
perimentation with the o ff ice  is  needed to  provide useful guides fo r 
assuring acceptance, v i s i b i l i t y ,  a c c e s s ib i l i ty ,  and effectiveness ."^  
Soon a f te r  the findings of the assemblies were publicized, s ta te  
le g is la tu re s  in Alaska, C a lifo rn ia , Colorado, Connecticut, F lorida, 
Hawaii, I l l i n o i s ,  Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
*The major points of the Scandinavian model include: o ff ice  of the
le g is la tu re ,  not executive; p o l i t i c a l ly  independent; no power to 
quash or reverse a decision; can investigate  on his own in i t i a t i v e ;  
methods are d i r e c t ,  informal, speedy, and cheap.
**American Assembly of Columbia University Harriman, New York, October, 




New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
2
Rhode Island, Washington, Wisconsin, and Puerto Rico reacted by 
introducing enabling leg is la t io n  th a t  would open the door fo r com­
plaint-handling mechanisms patterned a f t e r ,  but not re s t r ic te d  to ,  
the Scandinavian model. However, despite  th is  ra th e r  optim istic  
beginning, by 1973 only two s t a te s ,  Hawaii and Nebraska, had
3
adopted leg is la t io n  creating ombudsman-type o ff ices .  Although the 
limited response by the s ta te s  is  more than the experience a t  the 
federal lev e l ,  where no formal experimentation with the ombudsman 
concept has occurred, implementation of the ombudsman o ffice  a t  the 
s ta te  level is  s t i l l  the exception ra the r  than the ru le .  In the 
following pages, an analysis  of the major reasons why the s ta te s  
have not adopted or have been hesitan t  to  implement ombudsman 
off ices  will be discussed. Also, a case study of the Hawaiian 
experience will be provided to  give an indication of the impact of 
an actual ombudsman o ff ice  a t  the s ta te  level in the United S ta tes .
State  Barriers
Many of the obstacles th a t  have hindered or prevented the 
adoption of the ombudsman in s t i tu t io n  in the federal government 
are also evident a t  the s ta te  leve l.  For instance:
1. The quan ti ta t ive  argument, i . e . ,  the geographic and 
demographic s ize  of the American s ta te s  and th e ir  
populations is  s t i l l  a major consideration a t  the s ta te
19
leve l.  For instance, the Governor's o ff ice  in the 
S ta te  of California  receives approximately 2,000
4
inqu ir ies  per day concerning s ta te  government a c t iv i ty .
Ju s t  as a t  the federal lev e l,  an ombudsman, in order 
to  handle a caseload of th is  magnitude, would re ­
quire  the assis tance  of a small bureaucracy. No 
guarantee of equal treatment in adm inistrative processing 
of c i t iz e n s '  grievances would be possible.
2. The "b u il t - in "  antagonism between the executive, le g is la t iv e  
and ju d ic ia l  branches, embodied in the p rincip le  of 
separation of powers a t  the federal lev e l,  i s  equally
as important in s ta te  government. An ombudsman, em­
powered to cross p o l i t ic a l  boundaries to investigate  
c i t iz e n s '  complaints may be viewed by s ta te  government 
o f f i c i a l s  as a potential th rea t  to  the in s t i tu t io n a l iz ed  
system of checks and balances.
3. Since the creation of an ombudsman o ff ice  would en ta il  
e i th e r  executive action or le g is la t iv e  r a t i f i c a t io n ,  par­
t isansh ip  would again be a fac to r .  Party in -f igh ting  and 
petty  jea lousies  within and between members of the executive 
and le g is la t iv e  branches of government could hinder and 
possible  prevent an ombudsman from investigating  and 
solving c i t iz e n s ' complaints. Party c o n f l ic t  could also
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sabotage recommendations proposed by the ombudsman to  in ­
crease the effic iency  of the administrative process and 
overall government operations.
4. Perhaps the most f ru s tra t in g  problem the ombudsman would 
continuously be confronted with is  embodied in the con-
5
cept of "marble-cake" federalism. Ju s t  as a t  the federal 
lev e l,  extremely complex adm inistrative problems in ­
volving several governmental ju r isd ic t io n s  would 
probably confront the ombudsman on a da ily  basis . Despite 
whatever good in tentions an ombudsman may have to solve 
these problems, ju r isd ic t io n a l  r e s t r i c t io n s ,  combined 
with his limited au thority  to  persuade ra the r  than force 
agency ac tion , undermine his a b i l i ty  to  act in accordance 
with the seriousness o f a complaint.
5. According to  Walter Gel1 horn in Ombudsman fo r  American
Government, approximately 70 percent of current complaints
to le g is la to rs  involve p o l i t ic a l  questions and are to ta l ly
out of the ombudsman's ju r is d ic t io n .  This information
points out one of the most negative fea tures of the
ombudsman concept—th a t  ombudsman o ffices  are on the
whole forced, due to lack of ju r is d ic t io n ,  to  re je c t  a
6
majority of the complaints they receive.
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There is  no conclusive evidence tha t  the formal grievance- 
handling mechanisms curren tly  functioning a t  the s t a te  level are 
Ine ffec tive . The great majority of complaints concerning the 
operations of s ta te  government are sent to the Governor's o ff ice .
This allows the s t a f f  and the Governor not only to remain aware of 
the volume, type, and scope of grievances against the Incumbent's 
adm inistration, but a lso  gives them the opportunity to  monitor the 
actions taken by spec if ic  agencies and. I f  necessary, apply addi­
tional pressure to expedite the processing of c i t iz e n s '  complaints.
An ombudsman, on the other hand, given the broad and adm inistratively  
weak grant of au thority  c h a ra c te r is t ic  of the o f f ic e ,  would be hard- 
pressed to secure agency compliance I f  I t  did not coincide with his 
recommendations.
Also included In the California  study were s t a t i s t i c s  on the flow 
of mall received by randomly selected le g is la to rs .  "Two of the 
le g is la to rs  Included In the study averaged fewer than four com­
p la in ts  a week, while one le g is la to r  Is reported to  get 100 . . . .
All of the le g is la to rs  In the study f e l t  th a t  handling constituen t 
complaints was a necessary pa rt  of th e i r  job, and only in rare  c i r ­
cumstances, such as extremely controversial Issues, were there  more
g
complaints than the average le g is la to r  could handle.
Opponents of the ombudsman In s t i tu t io n  argue, therefore , th a t  
the courts ,  grand ju r ie s ,  government law o ff ice rs ,  the Governor's
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o ff ice ,  l e g is la to r s ,  le g is la t iv e  councils, interim le g is la t iv e  and 
executive committees, general le g is la t iv e  oversight, agency 
machinery for review or appeal and s ta te  provisions fo r  the publi­
cation of adm inistrative ru les and regulations e x is t  to  aid the
9
c it iz e n  who f a l l s  prey to governmental adm inistration. In fa c t ,
one of the most outspoken proponents of the ombudsman system has
admitted th a t:
. . .  the formal [grievance-handling] machinery of 
the s ta te  appears to be equipped . . , to handle 
general problems of adm inistrative organization, 
procedure, and e ff ic iency , and i t  may s t i l l  be argued 
th a t  the p a r t icu la r  problems of individuals can be 
resolved within the informal channels of redress pro= 
vided by the Governor's o ff ice  and the Legislature .
The preceding analysis  i l l u s t r a te s  some of the major obstacles
involved in the creation and implementation of an ombudsman o ffice
within the in s t i tu t io n a l  framework of s ta te  government in 'th e  United
S ta tes . Although the existence of these roadblocks has prevented
many s ta te s  from creating  ombudsman o ffices  patterned a f te r  the
Scandinavian model, th is  has not held true  in the case of Hawaii.
The Hawaiian Ombudsman Experience
Hawaii became the f i r s t  s ta te  to endorse the concept o f an 
ombudsman when i t s  le g is la tu re  passed the Hawaiian Ombudsman b i l l  
in 1967; however, the o ff ice  did not begin taking c it izen  grievances 
u n til  July 1, 1969.^^ Patterned a f te r  the Scandinavian model, the 
o ff ice  represents what appears to be the f i r s t  successful attempt
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to t ran s fe r  the ombudsman in s t i tu t io n  to s ta te  government in the 
United S ta tes . I ts  major objectives are:
1. redress of individual grievances;
2. prevent recurrence of sim ilar complaints;
3. increase responsiveness of adm inistrators;
4. p ro tec t government administrators from unfounded 
c r i t ic ism ;
5. iden tify  and correc t patterns of undesirable 
adm inistrative practices or procedures;
6. education of the public about governmental operations 
and functions; and
12
7. re l ieve  le g is la to rs  of the complaint-handling burden.
Operating on an annual budget of $103,000 and staffed  by from
6 to 9 persons, the o ff ice  has processed an average of 1,300 grievances 
per year.^3 success of the o f f ic e 's  operations thus fa r  have 
been a t t r ib u te d  to the personality  of the current ombudsman, Herman 
Doi. Doi has maintained an honest and open-relationship with execu­
t iv e ,  le g is la t iv e  and adm inistrative o f f ic ia l s  since the o ff ice  was 
created. His impartial handling of c i t iz e n s '  complaints has v i r tu a l ly  
eliminated i n i t i a l  c r i t ic ism  th a t  the ombudsman o ff ice  would become 
the tool of the dominant p o l i t ic a l  fac tion . As a r e s u l t ,  b ipartisan
support for the o ff ice  has increased to the point th a t  the Hawaiian
14ombudsman o f f ic e 's  fu ture  appears re la t iv e ly  secure. The nature of 
the o f f ic e 's  a c t iv i t ie s  is  such th a t  i t  supplements exis ting
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complaint-handling In s t i tu t io n s .  Since the o f f ic e 's  major goal Is 
to expedite the processing of c i t iz e n s '  grievances, constant cooper­
ation  with a l l  s ta te  government o f f ic ia l s  Is necessary. Doi has not 
attempted to "steal the spo tligh t"  from spec if ic  agencies In the
resolu tion  of complaints nor has he t r ie d  to pre-empt agency action
15
by sidestepping the formal and Informal adm inistrative  machinery. 
Also, c i t iz e n  expectations of the o ff ice  have large ly  coincided with 
I t s  legal au thority  to remedy complaints. Public re la tions  e f f o r t s ,  
focusing on personal appearances by the ombudsman, have educated 
the public with respect to  the o f f ic e 's  capacity to  solve c i t iz e n s '  
grievances. Consequently, th e i r  caseload r ^ T ^ c ts  a growing number 
of leg itim ate  grievances th a t  are  within th e i r  ju r isd ic t io n .^ ^  In 
add ition , the Hawaiian ombudsman o ff ice  has developed methods of 
operation th a t  p a ra lle l  those of the Scandinavian model, i . e . ,  they 
are d i r e c t .  Informal, speedy and cheap. The to ta l  cost per capita  
fo r  the establishment of the o ff ice  has run approximately 13^ while 
the cost per case Is about $100 and takes two weeks to  process.
These aspects are espec ia lly  appealing to lower Income per­
sons who cannot afford the expense of l i t i g a t io n  and to those whose 
complaint may not warrant the u t i l iz a t io n  of formal administrative 
or legal machinery.
Although many fac to rs  have contributed to  the success of the 
Hawaiian ombudsman's o f f ic e ,  such as the lack of strong p o l i t ic a l
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party c o n f l ic t ,  a high degree of adm inistrative s ta b i l i ty  and a
h isto ry  of adm inistrative , le g is la t iv e  and executive cooperation,
the experiment i s  not without i t s  problems. Because of the previous
18existence of as many as twelve complaint-handling in s t i tu t io n s ,  
duplication of services is  a major concern. Many times complaints 
w ill be received by the omdusman who, upon investigation , finds th a t  
the grievance has also  been reg is te red  with another complaint- 
handling o ff ice .  I f  th is  duplication goes unnoticed, adm inistrative 
confusion has developed as the agency or agencies in question 
attempt to process and solve the complaint. Since cooperation is  
necessary i f  complaints are to  be solved, an ombudsman must avoid 
c o n f l ic t  between adm inistrative  o f f ic ia l s  a t  a l l  costs . For in ­
stance, one Hawaiian s ta te  government adm inistrator f l a t ly  s ta te d ,
qg
"You s t a r t  harassing me, and I'm not going to cooperate." To 
prevent a s i tu a t io n  of th is  type from developing, on occasion the 
Hawaiian ombudsman has had to monitor passively the processing of a 
complaint ra the r  than attempt to apply pressure and risk  a l ien a ting  
the o f f ic ia l  involved. Since the Hawaiian ombudsman's powers are 
lim ited to those of persuasion and recommendation, the success of 
h is o ff ice  is  dependent on the willingness of others to cooperate. 
Also, care must be taken not to publicize the uncooperative stance 
taken by any s ta te  government o f f ic ia l  because, again, i t  may under­
mine the future  re la tionsh ip  between the ombudsman and the agency in 
question.
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Perhaps the g rea tes t  problem the Hawaiian ombudsman has faced
is  the evaluation of the effectiveness of his o ff ice .  To da te , no
poll has been taken to iden tify  the contribution th a t  the o ff ice
is  making both in the eyes of government o f f ic ia l s  and the c i t izen s
of Hawaii. The s t a t i s t i c s  th a t  are availab le  do not indicate  such
things as the average amount of time spent on each complaint, the
nature of the complaints th a t  are re jected  or the success r a t io
of the o f f ice .  Instead, the figures compiled simply indicate  th a t
of the 1,300 average yearly number of complaints received, only
20about 30 percent were considered va lid . This means th a t  approxi­
mately 70 percent of the grievances reported to the office  were 
re jec ted  fo r lack of ju r is d ic t io n  or were referred to a more ap­
propriate  agency for ac tion . The ju r isd ic t io n a l  problem, mentioned 
e a r l i e r  as one of the primary theo re tica l roadblocks to the successful 
operation of the ombudsman o ff ice  within a federal system, has 
thus proven to be a stumbling block in actual p rac tice . This s t a t e ­
ment is  corroborated by the Nebraska experience. There, only 40 
percent of a l l  grievances received were found to be within the
21
ombudsman's ju r isd ic t io n  and thus capable of being investigated.
Even in Sweden, where the ombudsman o ff ice  has been in operation
for 168 years , the number of valid  complaints received by the o ff ice
22averages approximately 15 percent.
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Because of the paucity of empërical da ta , i t  i s  extremely 
d i f f i c u l t  to determine whether the tran s fe r  of the foreign ombudsman 
o ff ice  to Hawaii has been a success. However, the v ir tua l  lack of 
p o l i t ic a l  opposition and c it iz e n  c ri t ic ism  are two indications th a t  
the o ffice  is  performing i t s  assigned functions ra the r  w ell. Con­
sequently, despite  the ju r isd ic t io n a l  problems th a t  have plagued 
the operations of the o f f ic e ,  i t  appears th a t  i t s  fu ture  as a 
legitim ate s ta te  complaint-handling agency is  re la t iv e ly  secure.
Conclusion
Although current experimentation a t  the s ta te  level with the 
ombudsman in s t i tu t io n  does not conclusively show th a t  the o ff ice  can 
be successfully  grafted  on to the s ta te  machinery, the Nebraska and 
espec ia lly  the Hawaiian experience have provided convincing proof 
th a t  the o ff ice  can function ra ther  e ffec t iv e ly  a t  the s ta te  leve l.  
However, since empirical evidence is  not ava ilab le , any predictions 
as to the possible contribution of an ombudsman o ffice  to  s ta te  
government operations would be speculation. To encourage experi­
mentation with the ombudsman in s t i tu t io n  a t  the s ta te  lev e l,  and 
thus provide an expanded basis for empirical observation, federal
money, through the Office of Economic Opportunity, has been made 
23availab le . This added stimulus should create  additional in te re s t  
in ,  and,in some cases, actual experimentation with the ombudsman 
in s t i tu t io n  and help remedy the informational d e f ic i t .
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CHAPTER II I  
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE OMBUDSMAN
As one might expect, scholarly  in te re s t  in transfe rr ing  the
ombudsman concept to  American government did not stop a t  the federal
and s ta te  leve ls . The same assembly th a t  espoused the v irtues  of
th is  form of grievance-handling mechanism a t  the s ta te  level also
recommended the
widespread adoption of the ombudsman concept in 
local governments. [However] American local 
governments vary so g rea tly  in s iz e ,  population, 
legal s t ru c tu re ,  and v i t a l i t y  th a t  we do not 
recomnend a uniform design fo r the local ombuds­
man. '
I ro n ica lly ,  the widespread in te re s t  and subsequent leg is la t io n  tha t  
characterized the s t a t e 's  experience did not m ateria lize  to any 
measurable degree in c i ty  and county governments across the country;
by 1973 the number of c i t i e s  and counties taking advantage of ombuds-
2
man-type in s t i tu t io n s  could be counted on one hand. The in ten t  of 
th is  section i s  to discuss the extent of local acceptance and 
implementation of the ombudsman in s t i tu t io n  and, by focusing on a 
spec if ic  local ju r is d ic t io n  u t i l iz in g  the services o f an ombudsman, 
give an indication of the nature of the o f f ic e 's  a c t iv i t ie s  and 
any problems i t  has experienced.
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The Setting for a Local Ombudsman
One ra tionale  for a federal system of government recognizes 
the r ig h t  of c it izen s  to create  and maintain the "amount" of 
government they deem necessary a t  each level to  accomplish so c ia l ly  
desired goals. Thousands of incorporated p o li t ic a l  e n t i t ie s  e x is t  
to  perform uniquely local functions, while the federal and s ta te  
governments scale  th e i r  a c t iv i t i e s  to provide for regional and 
national needs. The a b i l i t y  to  mould a p o li t ic a l  ju r isd ic t io n  to 
f i t  problems endemic to a p a r t ic u la r  area is  by fa r  the most impor­
ta n t  and without a doubt the most desirab le  phenomenon associated 
with local governments in th is  country.
Because of the proximity of local governments to  the people 
they serve, the re la tionsh ips between local o f f ic ia l s  and the local 
c it izen ry  are s t i l l ,  in many areas of the country, based on personal 
association . Much more so than a t  any other level of government 
in the United S ta te s ,  local o f f ic ia l s  are  immediately associated 
with the action or inaction of government and the success or 
f a i lu re  of local programs. Every day public services such as
garbage co llec t io n ,  road maintenance, s t r e e t  l igh ting , 
t r a f f i c  con tro l,  welfare adm inistration, police secu ri ty ,  
f i r e  f igh ting , planning and zoning, public u t i l i t i e s ,  
public tran sp o rta t io n ,  and a host of mundane but %
e sse n t ia l ly  community functions, s t r ik e  home to  everyone.
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The creation and operation of an ombudsman o f f ice  must be 
viewed In re la tion  to  the problems currently  facing local governments 
Recent local concerns have also  Included major problems such as 
urban decay, environmental degradation, r is in g  crime r a te s ,  dwindling 
tax bases and r is ing  unemployment. With limited financial resources 
availab le  and so many pressing problems confronting local o f f i c i a l s .  
I t  Is not d i f f i c u l t  to discern why limited experimentation with the 
ombudsman In s t i tu t io n  has occurred a t  the local level in the United 
S ta te s .  In order to stim ulate  local experimentation with the ombuds­
man In s t i tu t io n ,  federal funding through the Office of Economic 
Opportunity was made availab le  for p i lo t  projects designed to  t e s t  
the t ra n s fe ra b i l i ty  of the ombudsman In s t i tu t io n  to an urban cen ter. 
The following Is a discussion of one such pro jec t.
The Buffalo Ombudsman Demonstration Project
In the la te  summer of 1967, the Law School of the State  
University of New York a t  Buffalo received funds from the U.S.
Office of Economic Opportunity to sponsor an Ombudsman Demonstration 
Project. Since v i r tu a l ly  no empirical Information existed  concerning 
the p o ss ib i l i ty  of tran s fe rr in g  the ombudsman In s t i tu t io n  to  an 
American urban cen ter , th is  pro jec t was designed to help f i l l  th is
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void. Rather than attempt an explanation of the e n t i re  Buffalo 
experience as i t  unfolded during the 16 months of i t s  existence, 
th is  analysis will focus on those aspects of the demonstration p ro jec t
th a t ,  when considered as a whole, will give a su f f ic ie n t  indication  
of the o f f i c e 's  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  and ro le  a t  the local level.
The Role o f B uffalo 's  City O ff ic ia ls
I t  is  extremely important to note tha t  local o f f ic ia l s
did not, nor did the c i t iz e n s  they represent, lobby for
or i n i t i a t e  the Ombudsman Demonstration P roject. Instead, the
C itizens ' Administrative Service was spawned and for the most part
4run by people from the academic community. The only real ex­
ceptions were the people representing the neighborhood communities, 
o f which there were f ive .
Since the e n t i re  pro jec t was funded by the Office of Economic 
Opportunity, local o f f ic ia l s  could hardly turn i t  down. Tight 
budgets are the ru le  ra th e r  than the exception a t  the local lev e l;  
consequently, one of the major obstacles to the creation of an 
ombudsman o ff ice  is  the lack of funding. In th is  case, local 
o f f ic ia l s  had the opportunity to expand th e i r  operations in to  a 
re la t iv e ly  innocuous area with no cost attached.
The creation  of the o ff ice  also provided local o f f ic ia l s  with 
an opportunity to expand th e i r  ex is ting  grievance-handling capacity .
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Neighborhood o ffices  were created in minority and low income 
sections of the c i ty  and persons indigenous to  the neighborhoods 
were recru ited  to  work in the o ff ice s .  This emphasis is re f lec ted  
in the s t a t i s t i c s  compiled on the Administrative Services' c l ie n te l
66 percent of the complaints were black, 25 percent 
were white, 8 percent were Puerto Rican and 1 percent 
were Indian. Also, with respect to income leve ls , 
the calculations were necessarily  rough, but i t  is  
estimated th a t  complainants with incomes of less 
than $3000 comprised 26 percent; those with 
$3000-$5000 comprised 33 percent; and those with 
$5000-$7000 comprised 30 percent of the caseload.
The remainder had incomes over $7000.5
C harac te ris tic s  of the C itizens ' Administrative Service
Because the Project was handled by outside personnel, local
o f f i c i a l s  did not p a r t ic ip a te  in the advertis ing , screening and
se lec tion  of the ombudsman. In f a c t ,  the Project was designed to
operate without an o f f ic ia l ly  designated ombudsman and instead
u t i l iz e d  the services of law students and persons indigenous to
spec if ic  areas of the Buffalo community. During some periods, as
many as 15 people were d i re c t ly  involved in the processing
of c i t iz e n s  grievances th a t ,  when the pro ject ended a f te r  71 weeks
of operation, eventually to ta led  1,224.^ The areas receiving the
la rg e s t  number of complaints and inqu iries  were:
social service 153, public housing 119, 
building demolition 109, public health 103, 
s t r e e t  paving 54, p o l ic e - t r a f f ic  55, police- 
non traffic  44, and garbage removal 46 .'
35
S ta t i s t i c s  were a lso  availab le  th a t  indicated th a t  o f the 1,224 
complaints docketed, 143 were re jected  fo r  lack of ju r is d ic t io n ,
17 were dismissed because they orig inated outside the Buffalo c i ty  
l im its ,  and 10 were withdrawn by complainants before action could
g
be taken. Again, as in the case of Hawaii, the information did not 
include an analysis of the 1,054 cases handled to  determine whether 
they had been solved or not.
The operating budget of the C itizens ' Administrative Service
9
during i t s  16 months of existence was $123,182. This i s  more than 
the ombudsman fo r the State  of Hawaii receives, even though he 
serves twice the p o p u l a t i o n . T h e  point here i s  th a t ,  given the 
previously mentioned problems curren tly  facing many urban cen ters , 
i t  would be extremely d i f f i c u l t  fo r local o f f ic ia l s  to a llo ca te  
additional money or cut p re-ex is ting  programs to make room fo r an 
ombudsman o ff ice .  A perfect example of th is  phenomenon is  the City 
of Buffalo. After almost a year and a ha lf  o f operations under a 
federal gran t, the C itizens ' Administrative Service fa i led  to con­
vince the Buffalo City Council th a t  the benefits gained from the 
o ff ice  exceeded the costs . Consequently, when the grant expired 
on March 31, 1969, local funding was not made available  and the 
o ff ice  went out of existence.
The Buffalo Demonstration Project, because i t  "has been 
the only o ff ice  to date in an American indu s tr ia l  c i ty  functioning
36
12as an Ombudsman independent of c i ty  and county adm inistrations,"
did provide additional information concerning the f e a s ib i l i ty  of
adapting the concept of an ombudsman to urban centers in the United
S ta tes. However, cer ta in  practices employed by the p ro jec ts '
coordinators th a t  resu lted  in extensive deviation from the Scandinavian
model of the ombudsman in s t i tu t io n  have combined to undermine the
13pro jec ts ' f inal recommendations. For instance:
1. The need fo r an additional grievance-handling mechanism 
was never es tab lished . The Project coordinators simply 
assumed th a t  the C itizens ' Administrative Service would 
supplement ex is ting  appeal machinery and substan tia te  
i t s  existence by contributing to  the resolution of 
c i t iz e n s '  complaints. In the end, when su f f ic ie n t  
evidence was not presented to subs tan tia te  the o f f ic e 's  
con tribu tion , local funding was not made available.
(For another example of th is  s i tu a t io n ,  read Barriers 
to  Establishing Urban Ombudsman: The Case o f  Newark,
by William B. Gwyn.)
2. An actual ombudsman was never appointed. Instead, 
students or neighborhood aides were u t i l iz e d  to process 
complaints. Aside from estab lish ing  the need for an 
ombudsman in s t i tu t io n ,  the se lec tion  o f  the person to 
f i l l  the position is  perhaps the most controversial
37
stage In the Implementation of an ombudsman o ff ice .
Since local Input Into the se lec tion  of the o ffice  
personnel was re s t r ic te d  to supplying neighborhood 
a ides , v i r tu a l ly  no experience was gained In th is  
area.
3. Because of the methods employed by the project d ire c to rs .
I t  Is not c lea r  how the budget of an ombudsman o ffice  
should be determined or a t  what level the office  should 
be funded. Excessive outside funding In the beginning 
may c re a te ,  as In the Buffalo experience, a small 
bureaucracy too large fo r the local government Involved 
to fund once the grant has expired. Much more could 
have been gained I f  the pro jec t had operated on a much 
smaller budget--one th a t  would not have made local o f f ic ia l s  
balk a t  providing local money. As I t  i s ,  the fac t  th a t
the Buffalo City Council did not e le c t  to continue the 
p ro jec t may have contributed to  the hesitancy of other 
local governments considering adopting ombudsman-type 
o f f ice s .
4. The use of students Instead of professional personnel 
was advantageous to the pro ject d irec to rs  given the fac t  
th a t  th e i r  ultimate purpose was to  "t e s t  the operation
14
of the ombudsman In a typical American urban se t t in g ."  
Consequently, emphasis was placed on s t a t i s t i c a l
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considerations such as the volume, type and location of
complaints, and the social and economic ch a rac te r is t ic s
of the complainants ra the r  than on the professional
15handling and reso lu tion  of grievances. Unfortunately, 
with th is  approach there Is no way to determine I f  a 
highly respected, professional, council-appointed 
ombudsman would have had sim ilar re s u l ts .
5. The v ir tua l  lack of governmental p a rtic ipa tion  In a l l  
phases of the C itizens ' Administrative Services creation 
and operation Is an extensive deviation from the 
Scandinavian experience. As a re su l t  of the seminar 
approach taken by the Project d i re c to rs ,  no more In­
formation was made availab le  concerning the problems 
associated with the adoption and se lec tion  of an 
ombudsman a t  the local level than was previously known.
Drawbacks of the Buffalo Demonstration Project
Local governments do not a l l  conform to the same p o l i t ic a l  and 
adm inistrative  s truc tu re  and organization. Consequently, whatever 
Information th a t  was gained as a re su l t  o f the experimental ombuds­
man p ro jec t ,  because I t  was conducted within the ju r isd ic t io n  of 
a "strong" mayor-councll form of government, would not necessarily  
hold true  I f  a s im ilar experiment were to occur under a city-manager, 
county commissioner or "weak" mayor form of government.
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The C itizens’ Administrative Service also functioned completely 
independent o f local con tro l. Although independence is  a necessary 
requirement of an ombudsman in s t i tu t io n  patterned a f te r  the 
Scandinavian model, th is  does not mean th a t  the o ff ice  is  to ta l ly  
disassociated from local government o f f ic ia l s  and operations.
The o ff ice  in the model ex is ts  as an independent e n ti ty  within the 
local p o l i t ic a l  and adm inistrative apparatus. Because of th is  
peculiar Buffalo circumstance, no information was gained as to what 
the re la tionsh ip  of an ombudsman would be to local o f f ic ia l s  in an 
actual adm inistrative s i tu a t io n ,  i . e . ,  where complaints are  in v e s t i ­
gated by a council-appointed o f f i c i a l .
Care should also  have been taken by the p ro je c ts ’ coordinators 
to ind icate  the su ccess /fa ilu re  r a t io  of those cases ac tua lly  in ­
vestigated . One of the most often mentioned drawbacks to the imple­
mentation of the ombudsman in s t i tu t io n  is  the lack of data concerning 
the success of the o f f i c e ’s grievance-handling function. I f  emphasis 
would have been placed on th is  aspect, the information obtained 
from the study may have had a g rea ter  impact on local governments 
considering the creation of ombudsman o ff ices .
Conclusion
The problem of limited empirical data evident a t  both the s ta te  
and federal level is  a lso  a major concern a t  the local leve l.
Although the Buffalo Project was designed to help f i l l  th is  gap.
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i t s  contribution , because of the circumstances s ta ted  above, has 
not been as substan tia l as I t s  coordinators Intended. As a r e s u l t ,  
the compatibility of the ombudsman in s t i tu t io n  to local government 
remains questionable. Until fu r ther  evidence proves to  the con­
t ra ry ,  ju r isd ic t io n a l  c o n f l ic ts ,  caused by our federal system and 
the p rincip le  of separation of powers, a re  s t i l l  the most pressing 
problems confronting ex is ting  local ombudsman o ff ice s .  These 
obstacles , combined with trad i t io n a l  a t t i tu d e s  of leg is la to rs  and 
executives toward constituen t casework, must be overcome before 
widespread implementation of the ombudsman in s t i tu t io n  will occur 
a t  the local level in the United S ta tes.
General Summary: The Ombudsman and American Government
The decade-long debate concerning the compatibility  Of the
Scandinavian model o f the ombudsman concept with the American
p o l i t ic a l  system has been beset by normative and empirical problems.
Much of the l i t e r a tu r e
has frequently  consisted of su p e rf ic ia l ,  
formal descrip tions of the o f f ic e ,  s im ilar 
to previously published descrip tions and 
accompanied by l i t t l e  theo re tica l analysis 
of empirical research. The function served by 
such w riting  has been th a t  of disseminating the idea 
of the ombudsman throughout the w orld ,. . .and  has 
done l i t t l e  to  advance our understanding of the 
ombudsman in s t i tu t io n  and of the circumstances in 
th is  country relevant to i t s  adoption.'®
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However, despite  these problems, several ombudsman scholars 
(Gwyn, Gellhorn, Rowat, Moore) have been able to reach a consensus 
as to what may be the most desirab le  and undesirable aspects of an 
ombudsman In s t i tu t io n  In American government:
Desirable Consequences
1. The Introduction of an ombudsman o ffice  a t  any 
level of government, whether by executive order 
or le g is la t iv e  mandate, requires a minimum of_ 
organizational and no s tru c tu ra l  a l te ra t io n .
2. In most cases, public administrators do more than 
they would do In the absence of an ombudsman....
Improvement stems part ly  from the ombudsman's 
recommendations and part ly  from his mere existence, 
which prompts administrators to  take more care.
3. The leg is la tu re  Is b e t te r  prepared to  oversee and 
Improve adm inistrative procedures and practices .
This Is the re s u l t  of the ombudsman's annual report 
which brings before the le g is la tu re  administrative 
shortcomings which would otherwise not come to I t s  
a tten t io n .
4. Civil servants are protected from unfounded 
accusations.
5. When Individual or group grievances are redressed, a
positive  contribution Is made toward Improving the
c i t i z e n 's  re la tionsh ip  with government.2'
( /
Undesirable Consequences: The "Hidden costs" of the Ombudsman Concept
1. The tim id ity  of c iv i l  servants Is I n c r e a s e d . . . I .e . ,  
awareness th a t  someone Is constantly  looking over 
th e i r  shoulders causes some public o f f ic ia l s  to be­
come too timid Instead of too bold.
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2. The ombudsman's a c t iv i t i e s  can lead to  the 
creation of unnecesssry red tape. In a few in­
stances, adoration of the w ritten  word occupies 
so large a portion of the working day [of some 
o f f i c i a l s ]  th a t  accomplishments worth writing 
about become fewer and few er.. .
3. Occasionally ombudsman do more than they are su ited  
to accomplish and attempt to influence decisions best 
l e f t  to adm inistrators who are experts in handling 
c e r ta in  m atters. ^4
4. Since the ombudsman is  not himself engaged in ad­
m in is tra tive  a c t iv i ty ,  adm inistrators and leg is la tu re s  
are inclined to t r e a t  h is general proposals for reform 
as im practical.
5. The c it izen s  of a country with an ombudsman may be­
come complacent about governmental problems. Too 
many persons seem w illing  to suppose, on much too 
l i t t l e  evidence, th a t  God's in his heaven, a l l ' s  r ig h t  
with the world of public administration as along as 
somebody like  an ombudsman is  keeping an eye on 
operations. 26
In addition to these positive  and negative c h a ra c te r is t ic s ,  there 
i s  also  agreement among many ombudsman scholars with respect to  the environ­
mental req u is ite s  th a t  should be present before an ombudsman in ­
s t i tu t io n  can be created and before i t  can function e ffe c t iv e ly .
These are:
1. there must be a bureaucracy to be complained about;
2. a law-making in s t i tu t io n  independent of and able to  
regulate  the bureaucracy is  a mandatory p re requ is ite ;
3. general agreement as to standards of f a i r  and 
e f f ic ie n t  administration, accepted not only by the 
ombudsman, but a lso  by bureaucrats, leg is la to rs  and 
the r e s t  of society;
4. some degree of adm inistrative s t a b i l i ty ;
5. some degree of p o l i t ic a l  harmony, i . e . ,  a willingness 
on the part  of the p o l i t ic ia n s  and p o l i t ic a l  fac tions 
to respect the neutral position and im partia li ty
of the o f f i c e .2 '
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Although the problem of s iz e ,  both geographically and demo- 
graphlcally . Is of considerable concern a t  the federal lev e l,  and 
re la t iv e ly  Important In our la rger  s t a te s .  I t  does not co ns titu te  
a formidable b a rr ie r  to the operation of an ombudsman o ff ice  a t  
the local leve l. However, I t  Is f a i r ly  ce r ta in  tha t the major 
obstac les , our federal system and concept of separation of powers, 
will continue to prevent or hamper e f fo r ts  to adopt and operate 
ombudsman offices  a t  every level of government In the United 
S ta te s .  The current a t t i tu d e s  of members of le g is la t iv e  bodies 
th a t  "casework Is the proper function of the Indiv idual. . .and 
should not be delegated to  an adm inistrative body," also  will 
hamper the passage of reforms patterned a f te r  the Scandinavian 
model. And, given the presently  functioning formal and semi-formal 
appeal machinery a t  a l l  levels of government, the claims"of dup li­
cation of services will have to  be addressed and su f f ic ie n t ly  
quieted before widespread public and private  support of the ombuds­
man In s t i tu t io n  will be forthcoming.
The arguments surrounding the t ran s fe r  of the ombudsman system 
to the United States have focused almost exclusively on the question 
of I t s  com patibility  with our p o l i t ic a l  system and p r inc ip les . 
V irtually  no disagreement Is evident, even among the most ardent 
opponents of the ombudsman concept, with respect to the d e s i r a b i l i ty  
of having an e ffec tive  grievance-handling f a c i l i ty  th a t  Is d i r e c t .
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informai, speedy and cheap. Some local and s ta te  government 
o f f i c i a l s ,  unable to follow the requirements of the Scandinavian 
model, but convinced of the need fo r an ombudsman-type o ff ice  in 
government, have sidestepped the problem of le g is la t iv e  r a t i f i ­
cation  by looking to the executive branch for action . To expedite 
the creation of complaint-handling o ffices  sim ilar to the ombuds­
man in s t i tu t io n ,  many p o l i t ic a l  executives a t  the s ta te  and local 
levels  have been called  upon to  exercise th e i r  power to expand 
u n i la te ra l ly  the executive branch. In the following pages, an 
example and discussion of an executive ombudsman o ff ice  will be 
presented and a comparison will be drawn between i t  and an ombuds­
man o ff ice  patterned a f te r  the Scandinavian model.
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CHAPTER IV
EXECUTIVE OMBUDSMAN IN MONTANA:
THE CITIZENS' ADVOCATE OFFICE
On July 1, 1973J  Governor Thomas L. Judge formally announced 
the creation  of a C itizens ' Advocate Office for the purpose of 
"making s ta te  government more responsive and sensit ive  to the needs 
of Montana c i t iz e n s ."  Although i n i t i a l  funding for the o ff ice  was 
provided by the Governor's Office, a f te r  i t s  f i r s t  year of op­
era tion  the C itizens ' Advocate Office applied fo r and received a 
separate  a lloca tion  from the le g is la tu re .  The current 1977-79 
budget of the Montana C itizens ' Advocate Office is  $52,500 
and i t  is  s ta ffed  by the present c i t iz e n s '  advocate, Ms. Kathy 
McGowan and one fu ll- t im e  adm inistrative aide. Before 
dealing with the spec if ics  of the Montana experience, an analysis 
of the basic d ifferences between the executive ombudsman and the 
Scandinavian Model will be presented as well as an indication of 
the s im i la r i t ie s  between the two.
Scandinavian Model vs. Executive Ombudsman
According to Stanley V. Anderson, a leading American scholar 
on the ombudsman in s t i tu t io n ,  there are more s im ila r i t ie s  than 
d ifferences between the c la ss ic a l  ombudsman model and the American
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version i . e . ,  the executive ombudsman. In the conclusion of 
Executive Ombudsman in the United S ta te s . Anderson points out 
th a t :
The executive Ombudsman d if fe rs  from his 
c la ss ica l  cousin in th a t  the former is  de­
pendent upon the ch ie f  executive and serves 
a t  his p leasure , while a c lass ica l Ombudsman, 
once appointed [by a le g is la t iv e  body], serves 
for a fixed term a t  le a s t  formally independent 
of the appointing agency.2
Although not mentioned in Professor Anderson's a r t i c l e ,  relying on 
the executive as a source of au thority  may also create  a difference 
in the qua lif ica tions  required of the person to f i l l  the post of 
executive ombudsman. The personal a t t r ib u te s  such as honesty, 
in te g r i ty ,  knowledge of governmental operations and diplo­
matic a b i l i ty  may be important in the selection of an ombudsman 
under both models. In the case of an executive ombudsman,"however, 
party a f f i l i a t io n  may be as important, i f  not more important, than 
the personal q u a lif ic a tio n s  mentioned above. Whether party desig­
nation has any e f fe c t  on the functioning of an executive ombudsman 
o ff ice  will be discussed l a t e r  in re la tio n  to the Montana experience.
The c h a ra c te r is t ic s  most often associated with the c la ss ica l 
ombudsman in s t i tu t io n  are: d i r e c t ,  informal, speedy, cheap, highly 
v is ib le ,  highly access ib le , independent, c l ien t-cen te red , expert 
within i t s  sphere of competence and capable of developing general
3
recommendations for the improvement of complaint-producing s i tu a t io n s .
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An executive ombudsman in s t i tu t io n  encompasses a l l  of these
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  with the exception of "independence." Opponents
of the executive ombudsman concept argue th a t  the o f f ic e 's  close
t ie s  with the Governor's o ffice  and executive branch, p a r t icu la r ly
the p o l i t ic a l  a f f i l i a t i o n ,  combine to  undermine, i f  not destroy, i t s
independent s ta tu s .  However, according to  Anderson:
.. .ex ecu tiv e  Ombudsman and th e i r  c la ss ica l  counter­
parts are more a like  in independence and im partia li ty  
than one might assume. For instance, the c lass ica l 
Ombudsman must depend upon his le g is la t iv e  creator 
fo r budgetary support ju s t  as the executive 
Ombudsman must depend upon the ch ie f  executive.
Also, both types of Ombudsmen, as a matter of 
p rac t ice ,  are sen s it iv e  to the p o l i t ic a l  r e a l i t i e s  
within th e i r  ju r isd ic t io n s .
Paradoxically, the ch ie f executive often imposes
independence upon his executive Ombudsman Usually,
the ch ie f  executive wants complaints to be examined 
im partia lly . Moreover, in order to  preserve the 
in te g r i ty  and effectiveness of the o f f ic e ,  he is 
even w illing  to forego in tervention in some cases 
where he might otherwise prefer a judgment based on 
partisan  considerations.*
In terms of approaches to  complaint-producing and complaint- 
handling s i tu a t io n s ,  the "executive ombudsman will tend to stimulate 
fa s te r  and b e t te r  se rv ice , while c la ss ic a l  ombudsman offices  will 
tend to stim ulate  the a r t ic u la t io n  of f a i r  procedures in govern-
5
ment." Both o ff ices  will have an impact on the administrative 
operations o f government as long as the source o f  authority  maintains 
i t s  support and the bureaucracy is  w illing  to  cooperate. Neither 
o ff ice  has the c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  expertise  or power to a l t e r  rad ica lly
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the internal or external a c t iv i ty  and functions o f government.
Both are usually created to complement ex is ting  appeal machinery
and allow wider access to government, government o f f ic ia l s  and
government information. For the most p a rt ,
. . .d i f fe re n c e s  in mode of access and kind of 
expertise  r e f le c t  the d if fe re n t  emphases in 
the functions of c la ss ic a l  and executive Om­
budsmen. Executive Ombudsmen are re su l t-  
oriented. They s t r iv e  to expedite governmental 
action . They must be adept a t  cu tting  knots.
Classical Ombudsmen are  process-oriented.
They s t r iv e  to streamline governmental pro­
cedure. They must be adept a t  unravelling 
red tape.®
Montana and the Governor's C itizens ' Advocate Office 
In May of 1973, Governor Thomas L. Judge created a complaint- 
handling o ff ice  within the Executive Branch of Montana State govern­
ment. The "p ilo t"  p ro jec t was in i t ia te d  to  t e s t  the f e a s ib i l i ty  of 
e s tab lish ing  a formal appeal mechanism a t  the s ta te  leve l. During 
the i n i t i a l  phase of the o f f i c e 's  operations, Kent Kleinkopf, 
the f i r s t  C itizens ' Advocate and his administrative a s s i s ta n t ,
Kathy McGowan, functioned under a mandate sim ilar to  tha t  of an 
ombudsman o ffice  patterned a f t e r  the Scandinavian model. Public ity  
was shunned and emphasis was placed on discovering the e f fe c t  the 
new o ff ice  would have on ex is ting  adm inistrative machinery and pro­
cedures throughout the f i r s t  two months of the o f f ic e 's  ex is tence.
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By the end of June, the o ff ice  had received only 33 inquiries 
about s ta te  government operations, of which only 13 were actual 
complaints against government personnel or procedures. The paucity 
of complaints can be d ire c t ly  traced to  the low-key approach taken 
by the o ff ice  a t  the request of the Governor and the fac t  th a t  no 
to l l - f r e e  number was made availab le . From May 1, 1973 to July 1, 
1973,72.7 percent of the to ta l  number of complaints docketed were 
received by mail, 15.2 percent telephone (90 percent of these 
c a l l s  were lo c a l) ,  and 12.1 percent of the complaints were reg is te red  
personally. Of the 13 grievances levied against s ta te  govern­
ment, three d ea l t  with unemployment compensation, four were in the 
area of workman's compensation, three mentioned taxa tion , two were 
against the motor vehicles d iv is ion  of the Department of Ju s tic e ,  
and one person complained about the a c t iv i t ie s  and f a c i l i t i e s  of 
the Department of In s t i tu t io n s .  All of the 13 grievances were 
resolved by the C itizens ' Advocate Office except one complaint 
against the Department of Revenue and the one ag inst the Department 
of In s t i tu t io n s .  Governor Judge, pleased with the i n i t i a l  performance 
of the o ff ice  and the willingness of adm inistrative o f f ic ia l s  to 
work with the C itizens ' Advocate and his s t a f f ,  formally proclaimed 
the creation of the Montana C itizens ' Advocate Office on July 1, 1973.
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The Montana C itizens ' Advocate enjoys v i r tu a l ly  the same powers 
(with the exception of the a b i l i ty  to  prosecute bureaucrats and 
f isc a l  oversight) and has many of the same c h a rac te r is t ic s  of a 
le g is la t iv e  ombudsman. The major deviation from the Scandinavian 
model is  confined to the o f f ic e 's  adm inistrative s ta tu s ,  i . e . ,  i t s  
independence. According to Kathy McGowan, who was appointed to  the 
C itizens ' Advocate post in July of 1974, Governor Judge expects the 
o ff ice  to function independently of the Governor's Office and only 
on rare  occasions will she seek his help in resolving a complaint.
This imposed independence coincides with Stanley V. Anderson's 
version of an executive ombudsman's o f f ice .
One of the most in te res tin g  aspects of the Montana C itizens '
Advocate Office has been the introduction of the to l l - f r e e  telephone 
number. As previously noted, only 33 complaints were received by 
the o ff ice  during i t s  f i r s t  two months of informal operation.
Over 75 percent of these inqu iries  came by mail or through personal 
n o t if ic a t io n .  Once the o ff ice  was formally created and limited 
t o l l - f r e e  service (12 hours per month) was in s ta l led  in September of 
1973, the number of inqu ir ies  received by the o ff ice  increased 
almost 600 percent by the end of September (a 30 day period). The 
tremendous response can be almost to ta l ly  a t t r ib u te d  to  the i n s t a l l a ­
tion  of the t o l l - f r e e  number: of the 192 inqu iries  during the month
of September, 80 percent came by telephone, 10 percent by mail, 6 per­
cent by personal v i s i t  and 4 percent were referred  by the Governor's Office
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During July of 1975, a f te r  a 24 hour t o l l - f r e e  number was In s ta lled  
in the o f f ic e ,  the number of inqu iries  by telephone was approxi­
mately 93 percent of the to ta l  received and has averaged between 
91 percent and 95 percent since th a t  time.
Perhaps the g rea tes t  advantage of having a fu ll- t im e to l l - f r e e  
cap ab il i ty  is  th a t  i t  allows the c it izen s  of Montana, especially  
the poor, to u t i l i z e  the service a t  th e i r  own convenience. The 
significance  of the to l l - f r e e  number i s  i l lu s t r a te d  in a random 
sample of inqu iries  taken during July 1975 (considered a slow month) 
and January, 1976, when tax season increases the o f f ic e 's  caseload.
The following is  a discussion and an analysis of th is  sample.
Geographic D istribution
An important c h a ra c te r is t ic  associated with the Montana C itizens ' 
Advocate Office i s  th a t  i t s  services are u t i l iz e d  by an excellent 
cross-sec tion  of Montana communities. Figure 1 i l lu s t r a te s  the 
geographic location of a l l  of the complaints received by the o ff ice  
during the month of Ju ly , 1975. As might be expected, the larger 
communities, such as B ill in gs ,  Missoula, Great F a l ls ,  Bozeman and 
Helena, reg is te red  more complaints than smaller c i t i e s  and towns 
across Montana. V irtually  every geographic section of Montana is  
represented, thus a t te s t in g  to the o f f i c e 's  overall a c c e ss ib i l i ty .
To subs tan tia te  th is  claim, another geographic sample was taken
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during the month of January, 1976. Figure 2 shows th a t  there is
s t i l l  widespread u t i l iz a t io n  of the services offered by the C itizens '
Advocate Office.
Ju r isd ic tion a l  Considerations
Both the Buffalo and the Hawaiian ombudsman offices  were hampered
by ju r isd ic t io n a l  problems in the day-to-day resolution of c i t iz e n s '
grievances. The Montana C itizens ' Advocate Office, however, has
not experienced th is  dilemma. According to Stanley V. Anderson, th is
is  largely  due to the fa c t  th a t:
Basically , an executive Ombudsman needs only 
to  publicize the fa c t  th a t  he i s  there and 
wants to help. Classical Ombudsman must in ­
clude in th e i r  advertisements an explanation 
of the s ta tu to r i ly  defined scope. To an ex­
ecutive Ombudsman, a case is  anything a c it izen
wants: information, se rv ice , a complaint or 
simply a t ten t io n .  To an Ombudsman in the c la s s i ­
cal mold, a case often re la te s  to  the manner in 
which government provides i t s  se rv ices .?
The preceding quotation ap tly  describes the Montana executive
ombudsman experience. When asked about the ju r isd ic t io n a l  lim ita tions
of her o f f ic e ,  Kathy McGowan responded th a t  "even i f  a complaint
deals with a fed e ra l ,  county or local agency or government, an attempt
is  made to put the complainant in touch with the e n t i ty  most able
to s a t is fy  his needs." Also, since the o ff ice  has no s ta tu to ry
ju r isd ic t io n a l  l im ita t io n , over 98 percent of the approximately
55,000 complaints and inqu ir ies  received per year are able to  be
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are not within the C itizens ' Advocate O ffice 's  ju r isd ic t io n  have 
included two requests fo r  information during January, 1976, con­
cerning federal tax rebates and one complaint against the in e f­
fic iency  of the Amny's insurance p rac tices .
According to Ms. McGowan, most inquiries or grievances are 
reg is te red  by individuals . A check of the inquiries received by 
the o ff ice  in Ju ly , 1975, showed th a t  51.6 percent o f the complaints 
were male, 47.5 percent were female, and .9 percent were reg is te red  
by two highschool groups, one o il  company and a law firm. The 
January, 1976, figures were s im ila r ,  with 58.1 percent male,
41.8 percent female and .1 percent received from commercial e s ta b l is h ­
ments. No information was availab le  on the age, race , or income of 
those u t i l iz in g  the o f f ic e 's  serv ices.
The areas most often mentioned in c it izen  inquiries or com­
p la in ts  are: consumer a f f a i r s ,  unemployment insurance, labor
standards, workman's compensation, taxation , welfare, insurance,
g
motor veh ic les, landlord/tenant re la tionsh ips and natural resources. 
Again, a s t a t i s t i c a l  breakdown of the o f f ic e 's  a c t iv i t ie s  in the 
months of Ju ly , 1975 and January, 1976, i l l u s t r a te s  the general 
veracity  of th is  claim (see Figure 3). According to  Kathy McGowan, 
the large number of miscellaneous inquiries in July can be a t t r ib u te d  
to the to u r is t  season, i . e . ,  many Montanans inquire about the location
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Figure 3. Most often Mentioned Complaint Areas
During July of 1975 and January of 1976.
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and s ta tu s  of to u r is t  f a c i l i t i e s .  The large percentage of income 
tax questions can be a tt r ib u te d  to  the on-coming tax season. When 
asked about the number of actual grievances against s ta te  adminis­
t r a t iv e  o f f ic ia l s  and procedures, Ms. McGowan s ta ted  th a t  "only 
about 25 percent of the inqu iries  are  actual complaints against 
s ta te  government. The r e s t  a re  inquiries or requests for in fo r­
mation th a t  the C itizens ' Advocate Office e i th e r  supplies or re fe rs  
to a more appropriate agency." Of the 25 percent of the grievances 
against s ta te  government, Ms. McGowan estimated th a t  over 95 percent 
are  resolved to the s a t is fa c t io n  of a l l  those involved. An exact 
figure  could not be given because the o ff ice  i s  not able to  follow- 
up on a l l  of the complaints received.
P o li t ic a l  association  with the executive branch has not been 
a major fac to r  in the functioning of the C itizens ' Advocate Office. 
Ms. McGowan has attempted to remain completely independent of the 
Governor's o ff ice  and she believes th a t  she has accomplished th is  
goal. There is  s t i l l  the question of the se lec tion  of the c i t iz e n s '  
advocate and whether party a f f i l i a t io n  plays any ro le  in the process. 
The fa c t  th a t  the f i r s t  C itizens ' Advocate Kent Klienkopf, had been 
a long-standing member of the Democratic Party and a major fund­
ra i s e r  for Governor Judge in his 1972 bid for Governor would strongly 
suggest th a t  p o l i t ic a l  a f f i l i a t i o n  is  an important consideration.
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When asked about her fee lings on th is  sub jec t,  Ms. McGowan admitted 
th a t  when Kleinkopf was appointed party p o l i t ic s  may have played a 
ro le .  She f e l t ,  though, th a t  her se lec tion  was predicated on the 
fa c t  th a t  she had been Kleinlkopf's a s s is ta n t  and therefore  was aware 
of the in tr ic a c ie s  of running the o ff ice .  She also  said th a t  no 
one from the Governor's o ff ice  or any other branch of s ta te  govern­
ment ever questioned her about her party designation.
Opinions of Administrative and P o li t ic a l  O ffic ia ls  
The ro le  and, in many cases, the contribution of the C itizens ' 
Advocate Office has depended primarily on the cooperation and 
coordination of key p o l i t ic a l  and adm inistrative o f f i c i a l s .  Ms.
McGowan has indicated th a t  her o ff ice  has developed an excellen t 
working re la tionsh ip  with s ta te  government o f f i c i a l s ;  however, a more 
in-depth analysis may be in order to assess the v a lid i ty  of th is  claim. 
Administrators employed in the areas most often mentioned by c i t iz e n s  
in th e i r  complaints, such as Fred B a rre tt ,  Employment Security 
Division; Jake Wines, Consumer A ffa irs ;  Dick Cane, Labor Standards 
Division; Jack Carlson, Welfare Division; Mary Noel, Public Service
9
Commission, and Keith Col bo from the Governor's o ff ice  were contacted. 
All of the adm inistrative o f f ic ia l s  f e l t  th a t  the C itizens ' Advocate 
Office was an asse t to s ta te  government because the o ffice  provides 
a cen tra lized  complaint-handling and information service. None of
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the o f f ic ia l s  f e l t  th a t  the o ff ice  duplicated exis ting  appeal 
machinery. Every adm inistrator agreed with Ms. McGowan's descrip ­
tion  of the re la tionsh ip  th a t  her o ff ice  has developed with adminis­
t r a t iv e  o f f ic ia l s  in s ta te  government and are w illing to continue 
aiding the C itizens ' Advocate Office in the reso lu tion  of complaints. 
When asked whether the o ff ice  should be expanded or given additional 
power, such as the a b i l i ty  to subpoena adm inistrative o f f ic ia l s  or 
the power to prosecute uncooperative bureaucrats, f ive  of the six 
adm inistrators s ta ted  th a t  no changes were necessary and th a t  the 
o f f ice  should continue on i t s  present course.
The opinions of p o l i t ic a l  o f f i c ia l s  varied considerably.
Senator Pat Regan (D) from B illings continually  has u t i l iz e d  the o f f ic e 's  
se rv ices. She also  commented th a t  she advises her constituen ts to 
take advantage of the C itizens ' Advocate Office whenever possible . 
Although Mrs. Regan had i n i t i a l l y  favored a b i l l  (1975) th a t  would 
have created a le g is la t iv e  ombudsman o f f ic e ,  she does not feel the 
same way now. According to  Mrs. Regan, Cathy McGowan's operation of 
the o ff ice  has been "as a p o li t ic a l  as possible given the in s t i tu t io n a l  
associa tion  with the executive branch and the o ff ice  i s  doing a 
f ine  job ."^^
Senator Frank Hazelbaker (R) from Dillon and Representative 
Ralph Eu(j^ly (R) from Missoula had mixed fee ling  about the C itizens '
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Advocate Office. Neither le g is la to r  has ever personally u t i l iz e d  
the o f f i c e 's  serv ices; however, both have referred  constituents  to 
the o ff ice .
Both Eudjly and Hazelbaker also  f e l t  th a t  the o ff ice  could 
function more e ffec tiv e ly  in the le g is la t iv e  ra th e r  than executive
I
branch. According to Mr. Eudily, the o ff ice  should be under the
control of the le g is la t iv e  council because "less p o l i t ic s  are  played
12
there and the o ff ice  would be given more independence." However, 
he was unable to c i te  examples where p o l i t ic s  entered into the oper­
a tions of the C itizens ' Advocate Office.
Conclusion
Widespread u t i l i z a t io n  of the C itizens ' Advocate O ffice 's  
services has enabled i t  to  become an important vehicle for the t ra n s ­
mission and resolution of c i t iz e n s '  grievances against s ta te  govern­
ment. The in s ta l la t io n  of the t o l l - f r e e  capab ili ty  (which has been 
done in ne ither Hawaii nor Buffalo) and, j u s t  recen tly , a device th a t  
allows the deaf to contact the o f f ic e ,  has, and w ill continue to be 
the dominant means fo r c i t iz e n s  to  make th e i r  demands or questions 
known and one of the most important reasons for the o f f ic e 's  apparent 
success. Since less than 5 percent of the o f f ic e 's  inquiries  are  re ­
jec ted  on ju r isd ic t io n a l  grounds, i t  i s  able to play a much larger ro le  in 
the overall operation of s ta te  government. In f a c t ,  the o ff ice  has been
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so successful th a t  e f fo r ts  were made in the 1973 (HB 597 sponsored 
by Baucus, Ulmer, Kimble and Regan) and 1975 (HB 411 sponsored by 
Vincent, Kimble, et. a l  ) le g is la t iv e  sessions to  transform the 
C itizens ' Advocate Office Into a le g is la t iv e  ombudsman. Both b i l l s  
fa i le d  to receive the necessary votes fo r passage.
In terms of a c c e s s ib i l i ty ,  the Montana C itizens ' Advocate 
Office, because of the t o l l - f r e e  telephone c ap ab il i ty ,  has surpassed 
the experience of both Buffalo and Hawaii. The approximately 55,000 
Inquiries  per year compared to  1,300 In Hawaii and 864 In Buffalo, 
where the o ff ices  operate on an 'b igh t- to -f lv e"bas is  without t o l l -  
free  se rv ice . I l lu s t r a te s  the extent to  which c i t iz e n s  of Montana 
u t i l i z e  the o ff ice  and the s ignificance of the to l l - f r e e  number.
The broad mandate c h a ra c te r is t ic  of an executive ombudsman and of 
the Montana C itizens ' Advocate Office also enhances I t s  a b i l i ty  to 
f ie ld  and Investiga te  Inqu ir ies . Both the Hawaiian and the Buffalo 
ombudsman o f f ic e s ,  however, were plagued by ju r isd ic t io n a l  problems 
th a t  caused them to r e je c t  over h a lf  of a l l  complaints received.
The question of p o l i t ic a l  a f f i l i a t i o n ,  so often mentioned as a 
deficiency of the executive ombudsman, does not appear to play any 
more of a ro le  In the C itizen 's  Advocate O ffice 's  operations than 
In the Buffalo or Hawaiian ombudsman o ff ice s .  In f a c t ,  the I n s t i tu ­
tional and p o l i t ic a l  attachment to the executive branch has had more
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of a positive  e f fe c t  on the functioning of the C itizens ' Advocate 
Office than a negative one. Although most administrators feel th a t  
the o f f ic e 's  success thus fa r  i s  re la ted  to i t s  in s t i tu t io n a l  assoc­
ia t io n  with the Governor's o f f ic e ,  they do not feel th a t  i t  under­
mines the o f f ic e 's  c re d ib i l i ty  as a complaint-handling agency.
The re la t iv e  ease with which the executive ombudsman o ff ice  can 
be created and made operational a t  any level of government in the 
American p o l i t ic a l  system is  one of i t s  most desirab le  c h a ra c te r is t ic s .  
Because the o ff ice  i s  e s se n t ia l ly  an extension of the executive 
branch and since adm inistrative o f f ic ia l s  are  accustomed to  executive 
oversight or executive involvement in adm inistrative m atters, the 
circumstances th a t  form the basis for the a c t iv i t ie s  of the executive 
ombudsman d i f f e r  from those of a le g is la t iv e  ombudsman. S p ec if ica lly ,  
the existence of an executive ombudsman o ffice  within lo ca l,  s ta te  
or the federal government does not cons titu te  a th rea t  to the 
separation of powers doctrine nor would i t  undermine or replace the 
casework function of the le g is la t iv e  as well as ju d ic ia l  branches of 
government.
In the short run, the executive ombudsman o ff ice  can be a highly 
e ffec tiv e  complaint-handling and information center. I t  can provide 
a valuable service to c i t iz e n s  a t  any level of government and, 
through the issuance of quarte rly  and annual repo rts ,  allow the 
executive to remain constantly  aware of c i t iz e n s '  demands on government
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In the long run, though, the executive ombudsman does not have the 
expertise  or the capab il i ty  to I n i t i a t e  preventative programs to 
h a l t  recurring adm inistrative blunders. In cases where the adminis­
t r a t iv e  process Is malfunctioning, the le g is la t iv e  ombudsman e x is ts  
to  make recommendations and I n i t i a t e  procedures designed to  elim inate 
In e f f ic ie n t  adm inistrative p rac tices . I t
Is speedier and more e f f i c ie n t  to  turn to the 
[executive ombudsman] for au th o r i ta t iv e  action 
when a government service — such as removing 
dead animals or providing police protection —
Is not forthcoming. The more complicated cases 
undertaken by a c lass ica l  Ombudsman are not 
usually as uroent nor as amenable to  precipitous 
In tervention. *
Both grievance-handling mechanisms share many fine q u a l i t ie s ,  and
In some cases, the adoption of the executive ombudsman may be a step
toward the l a t e r  Implementation of the le g is la t iv e  ombudsman.
E ssen tia lly ,
the executive Ombudsman o ff ice  should not 
be viewed as a perversion or d is to r t io n  
of the Ombudsman Idea, but ra the r  as a 
varia tion  of I t ,  and possible  combination with 
I t ,  presenting s l ig h t ly  d if fe re n t  congeries of 
advantages and weaknesses. E ither the ex­
ecutive or c la ss ica l  versions alone, and both 
together, are e ffec t iv e  devices to  redress In­
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SUMMARY
Widespread adoption of the c la ss ica l  model of the ombudsman in ­
s t i tu t io n  in the United States does not appear l ik e ly  in the near 
fu ture . However, the a v a i la b i l i ty  of federal funds may stimulate 
experimental pro jects th a t  will help f i l l  in the existing in ­
formation gaps. These pro jec ts  must address the "hidden costs" 
of the c la ss ica l  ombudsman in s t i tu t io n ,  i . e . ,  whether the o ff ice  
increases the tim id ity  of c iv i l  servan ts, causes unnecessary red 
tape, undermines the separation of powers doctrine or will be con­
s i s te n t ly  hampered by our federal system of government. Perhaps 
the most important obstacle th a t  must be overcome is  convincing 
government o f f i c i a l s ,  p a r t icu la r ly  le g is la to r s ,  tha t the o ff ice  
will make a valuable contribution to  exis ting  operations and will 
not undermine or replace the casework function of le g is la t iv e  
o f f i c i a l s .
Since there i s  general agreement among government o f f ic ia l s  
th a t  there is  a need for a more informal and less costly  approach 
toward grievance-handling, the basis for the introduction of an 
ombudsman o ff ice  does e x is t .  Although endowed with these 
c h a ra c te r is t ic s ,  the present drawbacks and problems associated with 
the c la ss ica l  ombudsman in s t i tu t io n  have combined to severely hinder
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the p o s s ib i l i ty  of I t s  adoption. To sidestep these obstacles and 
s t i l l  s a t is fy  the desire  for a less structured complaint-handling 
o f f ic e ,  executive ombudsman o ffices  have been created In many s ta te  
and local governments across the country. The Montana C itizens '
Advocate Office, as an example of an executive ombudsman In s t i tu t io n ,  
I l lu s t r a te s  the s im i la r i t ie s  between the two models and some of the 
advantages associated with an executive ombudsman o f f ice .  Despite 
the s im ila r i t ie s  In s t ru c tu re ,  mandate and methods of operation be­
tween the two models, the major d ifferences . I . e . ,  the source of 
au thority  and the level of Independence have been the basis fo r  the 
general accfgjbance and success of the executive ombudsman o ff ice  and the 
primary reasons why the older Scandinavian model has not been widely 
adopted. The executive ombudsman o f f ic e ,  as an arm of the executive 
branch, represents a more t rad i t io n a l  or In s t i tu t io n a l  approach 
toward handling c i t iz e n  Imput. The c lass ica l  model,which requires 
a to ta l ly  Independent Investiga tor empowered to  cross a l l  p o l i t ic a l  
and adm inistrative boundaries with the exception of the courts , 
represents a radical departure from ex is ting  methods of operation 
and our p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re . Over the years,const1tut1onally  mandated 
l im its  o f the executive, l e g is la t iv e  and ju d ic ia l  branches of govern­
ment have caused p o l i t ic a l  and administrative o f f i c i a l s  to  become 
openly pro tective  and even suspicious of e f fo r ts  to impinge on or r e s t r i c t  
th e i r  methods of operation or scope of au thority . Since an ombudsman
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under the c lass ica l  model represents a d irec t  th rea t  to th is  power 
s tru c tu re ,  very l i t t l e  support for i t s  adoption can be expected.
I t  is  one thing to have an executive appointee investigating  
complaints of maladministration and quite  another to  have a highly 
soph istica ted , independent, s ta tu to r i ly  protected ombudsman with the 
power to disregard p o l i t ic a l  boundaries. Because of th i s ,  the 
executive ombudsman appears to  be fa r  more appealing to  most p o l i t i c a l ,  
adm inistrative and legal fac tions .
Continued c r i t ic ism  and concern about the effectiveness of ex­
is t in g  appeal machinery and grievance-handling procedures may re su l t  
in the growth of a more conducive environment in which the c la ss ica l  
ombudsman o ff ice  can be introduced and adopted. Until then, emphasis 
will probably remain on complaint-handling o ff ices  th a t  can be 
eas ily  created, inexpensively operated and e as i ly  dissolved, i . e . ,  
the executive ombudsman. This emphasis, though, ex is ts  not because 
the executive ombudsman has more to o ffe r  than h is  c la ss ica l  counter­
p a r t .  Because the le g is la t iv e  ombudsman, in theory and in p rac tice , 
is  a highly soph is tica ted , w ell-respected, professional grievance 
handler, while the executive ombudsman normally lacks professional 
adm inistrative expertise  and the o ff ice  is  more a part of the 
bureaucracy than a "watchdog" over i t .  When stripped of a l l  the 
normative rh e to r ic ,  an analysis  of the reasons why the executive 
ombudsman o ff ice  is  gaining in popularity while the c la ss ica l  model 
appears to be losing support, must focus on the fac t  th a t
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1. the executive ombudsman Is not there to  change or r e ­
organize ex is ting  adm inistrative procedures and machinery. 
Information processing and dissemination is  the executive 
ombudsman's primary resp ons ib ili ty  — not the resolution 
of c i t iz e n s '  grievances;
2. the le g is la t iv e  ombudsman is  an a c t iv e , external agent 
empowered to inves tiga te  and make recommendations to 
a l t e r  operations in any government o ff ice  or agency.
The c la ss ica l  model is  characterized by a much more 
positive  approach toward c i t iz e n s '  inqu iries and emphasis 
is  placed on the reso lu tion  of c i t iz e n s '  grievances.
Recent evidence has indicated th a t  when executive, le g is la t iv e  
and adm inistrative o f f i c i a l s  in th is  country attempt to weigh the 
merits of both models against th e i r  respective ram ifications, the 
decision to opt fo r the services of an executive ombudsman is  by no 
means a mystery. After a l l ,  why create  an o ff ice  with the au thority  
to meddle in a l l  of s ta te  government's operations when a re la t iv e ly  
powerless mechanism such as an executive ombudsman can be created 
and most, i f  not a l l  of the positive  features of the c lass ica l 
ombudsman in s t i tu t io n  can s t i l l  be rea lized .
Essen tia lly  th is  paper has dea lt  with the d is t in c t io n  between 
the c la ss ica l  ombudsman in s t i tu t io n  and the Montana C itizens ' 
Advocate Office. The basis for th is  d is t in c t io n  l ie s  in the source 
of au thority  th a t  is  u ltim ately  responsible for the o f f ic e 's  c reation  
and operation. I t  is  p rec ise ly  the source of au thority  th a t  prevents 
the Montana C itizens ' Advocate Office from effec ting  fa r  reaching 
changes in the adm inistrative system and re legates i t  to  the position 
of an information processing and dissemination service ra th e r  than 
an ac tive  complaint-handling agency.
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Because we can draw these categories as conceptually d i s t in c t ,  
we need not assume th a t  processing information and handling complaints 
a re  d i s t in c t  in p rac tice . For instance, an inquiry into the s ta tu s  
of a delayed social secu rity  payment Is categorized as a "complaint" 
and, through information processing, i . e . ,  a telephone call to  an 
appropriate agency, the "complaint" is  solved. In a c tu a l i ty  though, 
th is  may only i l l u s t r a t e  the limited a b i l i ty  and capacity inherent 
in the C itizens ' Advocate Office. Namely, i t  intervenes to  ensure 
th a t  the present machinery is  functioning properly ra ther than 
probing into areas where the adm inistrative  machinery is  producing 
less  than sa t is fa c to ry  r e s u l ts .  Such probing may well be the most 
s ig n if ic a n t  function of the c la ss ica l  ombudsman and the major d is ­
t in c t io n  between the Montana C itizens ' Advocate Office and an 
ombudsman o ff ice  patterned a f t e r  the Scandinavian model.’ As a 
r e s u l t  of th is  d is t in c t io n ,  the C itizens ' Advocate Office, a l ­
though i t  shares many of the c h a rac te r is t ic s  and po ten tia ls  of 
the c la ss ic a l  model, but a t  the same time lacks the essen tia l in ­
gredients of an ombudsman in s t i tu t io n ,  cannot, according to 
foreign standards, be c la s s if ie d  as an "ombudsman" o ff ice .
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